Conceptualizing emotion in information systems development by Stacey, Patrick & Chiasson, Mike
Please	  cite	  this	  paper	  as:	  
Stacey,	  P.K.	  and	  Chiasson,	  M.	  (2014)	  “Conceptualizing	  Emotion	  in	  Information	  Systems	  







Lancaster University Management School 
Working Paper 2014:5 
Conceptualizing Emotion in Information 
Systems Development 
Dr. P.K. Stacey & Professor M. Chiasson 
The Department of Management Science 
Lancaster University Management School 
Lancaster LA1 4YX 
UK 
© Dr. Patrick K Stacey and Professor Mike Chiasson 
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgment is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/publications 





The purpose of this theory paper is to develop a contextual theory of appraisal that may 
be drawn on to understand emotional processes in IS development (ISD). In short, 
emotion matters to ISD because managers/professionals lack capacity in dealing with 
emotionality whether positively or negatively, and there are very few ISD studies that 
directly focus on emotion. We develop a theoretical lens by inductively examining the 
substance and intellectual heritage of four emotion theory streams: feeling-centered (e.g. 
stimulus-response), traditional cognitivist, contemporary cognitivist and socio-cultural. 
Our model particularly draws on process appraisal theory and extends it with derivative 
concepts of structuration theory. The resulting contextualized appraisal theory (CAT) 
constitutes our main contribution to the ISD field. 
 
Keywords: emotion, information systems development, appraisal theory, structuration 
theory, theoretical lens  
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Conceptualizing Emotion in Information Systems Development 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a contextual theory of appraisal that may be drawn on 
to understand emotional processes in IS development (ISD). Traditionally, ISD research has 
particularly focused on engineering and human/social issues. Examples of the engineering 
issues include work on discrete technical properties of software work, such as software 
reusability (Johnson, 1988; Banker and Kauffman, 1991), software architecture correctness 
(Barber and Holt, 2001), algorithms (Morris et al., 1992; Mookerjee and Dos Santos, 1993), 
methodologies, methods and approaches (e.g. Royce, 1970; Beck and Boehm, 2003). With 
regards human/social issues, researchers have considered participation and conflict (e.g. 
Mumford, 1983; Robey and Markus, 1984; Wastell, 1996; Barki and Hartwick, 2001), 
software development agility (Lee and Xia, 2010), organisation-wide transformations (e.g. 
Humphrey et al. 1991; Paulk et al., 1994; Nielsen and Norberg, 2001; Fitzgerald, 2006), inter-
organizational best practices (Radice et al, 1999), collaboration (e.g. Levina, 2005; Vlaar et al, 
2008), creativity (Nandhakumar et al, 2013), Improvisation (e.g. Ciborra, 2002) and issues of 
process/context (e.g. Curtis et al, 1988; Walsham, 1993). The issues presented are not meant 
to be exhaustive but indicative. So, why should ISD now concern itself with emotion? What is 
the justification for this focus?  
 
Justifying an emotion focus 





“The theory is that emotional problems within organizations do not simply disappear when 
they are not faced; rather they tend to obstruct the carrying out of rational plans.” (Argyris, 
1971:p.B-290)  
 
Second (J2), the above quote indicates that emotional problems cause process obstructions. 
 
Third (J3), J2 implies that emotion is an important antecedent to the conduct of planned 
software work. Planned ISD work includes the aforementioned engineering aspects such as 
methods (e.g. Royce, 1970; Beck and Boehm, 2003). 
 
Fourth (J4), following on from J1, managers/ISD professionals lack capacity in dealing with 
emotionality: 
 
“The strategy being suggested is that the competence of both managers and MIS professionals 
in dealing with emotionality and strain in interpersonal and intergroup problems must be 
raised.” (Argyris, 1971:pB-290) 
 
This point was reinforced in a study of the London Ambulance Service: 
 
“frameworks or models for information systems development and management should 
address emotional as well as cognitive aspects, and also the interrelationship between these 
two dimensions. In this way, they need to attend to the moods in which actors approach the 





Fifth (J5), when J2 is resolved, i.e. emotional moments of misapprehension (Bagozzi, 2003; 
Vlaar et al, 2008), team relations/bonding benefits follow, yielding an esprit de corps 
(Humphrey et al, 1991:p.21).  
 
Sixth (J6), in the sense of J5, emotions are a motivational resource (e.g. Fredrickson, 2001; 
Fineman, 2003); emotions are not only responses to occasions but triggers too, impelling us 
along paths that reflect our priorities (Fineman, 2003:p.103; Lazarus, 1991). There is a great 
deal of interest in motivation theory in ISD, and more recently in the gamification literature 
(e.g. Nandhakumar et al, 2013; Deterding et al, 2011).  
 
Seventh (J7), following from J5, when emotions impel the enactment of rational plans, the 
reasoned action involved is still suffused with emotion. Feelings arise more rapidly than 
conscious thought, unwittingly informing our cognitive reasoning processes (Argyris, 1971; 
Kunda, 1990). This is upheld by: (i) the Theory of Motivated Reasoning (Kunda, 1990), (ii) 
cognitive emotion theorists: emotions signal, sensitise relevant experiences that are drawn on 
in action (Fineman, 2003; Scherer, 1987), and, (iii) product design literature:  “Affect 
therefore regulates how we solve problems and perform tasks.” (Norman, 2002:p39) Emotion 
therefore applies to a range of ISD process studies.  
 
Eighth (J8), when rational ISD plans break down, more improvised, extemporaneous 
approaches are apposite in order to manage an emerging situation (Orlikowski 1996; Ciborra 
1999; Ciborra, 2002). There are still questions over how improvisation ‘works’ despite a great 
many studies that take knowledge and context into account (Berliner, 1994; Weick, 1998). 
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Ciborra (2002) asserts that understanding emotion is the key here. From this we can say that 
emotion is an integral aspect of both planned and situated, extemporaneous kinds of action, 
not solely confined to being an antecedent, but as an ongoing resource (Fredrickson, 2001) 
that is drawn on to inform the process. 
 
Ninth (J9), there is only a small scattering of ISD studies that directly focus on emotion (e.g. 
Nelson, 2005; Wang and Ahmed, 2002, McGrath, 2002); it is a topic and concept that 
requires more focus per se.  
 
Furthermore (J10), there is increasing concern with sociomateriality in ISD with calls for 
more sociomaterial lenses (Orlikowski and Scott, 2007:p.437). The theoretical lens we 
develop in this paper could address this need.  
 
These ten justifications, demonstrate the relevance of emotion to ISD as well as potential 
contributions. Generally, the ISD field needs a comprehensive theorization of emotion. A 
general aim of this paper is to address this theoretical deficiency. We now explicate our 
particular aims. 
 
Aims of the Paper 
The main aim of this paper is to develop a Type II theory (Gregor, 2006) – a theoretical lens 
of emotion for ISD phenomena, such as those aforementioned in the justifications and 
human/social ISD research themes. This theory type is appropriate since emotion is still 
imperfectly understood (Gregor, 2006:p.625). We inductively examined (e.g. Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995) the substance and intellectual heritage of various emotion theories, which can be 
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grouped into four basic streams: feeling-centered (e.g. stimulus-response), traditional 
cognitivist, contemporary cognitivist and socio-cultural. We draw on process appraisal theory 
(e.g. Scherer, 1987) and extend it with derivative concepts from structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984). The resulting Contextualized Appraisal Theory (CAT) constitutes our main 
contribution to the ISD field. Follow-on contributions include an understanding of (i) what 
emotion shapes: e.g. the evaluation of ISD phenomena, leading to actions and adaptations that 
shape and steer the course of an ISD project (Fineman, 2003; Scherer, 1987), (ii) what 
emotion is shaped by, e.g. the interpretive conditions of ISD - the interpretative schemes or 
assumptive stocks of knowledge (Schutz, 1967; Gouldner, 1971; Giddens, 1984; Walsham, 
1993) involved such as assumed understandings of software development methodologies and 
tools, project experiences, associated emotional experiences and taken-for-granted learning, 
adaptations, on-going sensemaking processes that relate emotional stimuli to interpretative 
schemes and outcomes.  
 
Before proceeding with an overview of our CAT model, we begin by briefly distinguishing 
emotion from associated concepts of mood and dispositional affect.  
 
Distinguishing Emotion  
Referring to Figure 1, emotions are shorter in duration, more focused and intense (Frijda, 
1994; Moors, 2009; Callahan and McCollum, 2002; Scherer 1987). Emotion involves the 
greatest sensitivity and reaction to discrete events and stimuli. We could say that emotion is 
more ‘spiky’ – it comes and goes quickly, relative to other affect types, although its 
consequences may endure (Bartel and Saavedra, 2000). In contrast, mood involves less 
sensitivity to stimuli (cf. Ekman, 1984), but it can still greatly affect individual and groups by 
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creeping up and way on him/her.  As a result, it is more enduring than emotion and may exist 
before and after a particular event or stimulus. Finally, dispositional affect - an individual's 
general affective attitude to the world (Lazarus, 1991) - is even less sensitive to events than 
mood or emotions; it is more of a background condition for mood and emotion. Drawing 
attention to these distinctions illustrates the importance and difference of emotion from mood 
and affect; it is more potent, and has a greater potential for upheaval and dramatic effects on 
ISD processes, both positive and negative.  
 
 
Figure 1: Affect Types versus Temporality 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: (i) we justify our adoption of appraisal process 
theory perspective, (ii) we present an overview of our contextual appraisal theory, which 
extends appraisal process theory, (iii) we proceed to discuss each of the theory’s components 
and sub-components in detail, (iii) we extend the appraisal sub-components with derivative 
concepts of structuration theory, specifically the theory of interpretative schemes and 
reflexive monitoring, (iv) we then proceed synthesize the detailed points of the model and in 
doing so attend to issues of philosophical compatibility, before drawing the manuscript to a 
















Justifying an Appraisal Process Theory Perspective 
This paper fundamentally adopts an appraisal process theory perspective. Our reasoning for 
adopting this is three-fold. Firstly, appraisal theory is regarded as overcoming the 
shortcomings of the more ‘primal’ theories of emotion (Roseman and Smith, 2001) including 
stimulus-response theories (Watson, 1919), neuro-physiological processes (Descartes, 1649; 
Cannon, 1927; James, 1894), display theories (Tomkins, 1962; Ekman, 1973) and motivation 
theories in the realms of basic needs such as child hunger (Tomkins, 1962) and intimidation 
(Parkinson, 1997). Secondly, the above theories lack the capacity to explain certain 
phenomena including inconsistent responses to stimuli, the situation of the emotional 
experience (even appraisal theory itself does not entirely and at all times), the irrational 
aspects of emotions such as being complimented but not being able to accept it, and emotion’s 
developmental facet – some take time to develop, i.e. we are not born with them, but are 
learned through engagement with normative processes. Thirdly, ISD work is infused with 
interpretative processes (e.g. Pentland, 1992; Walsham, 1993; Wastell, 1996). There is 
therefore a ready compatibility of focus and concern between an established tradition in ISD 
and the appraisal theory we develop further in this paper.  
 
Specifically, we build-on the process model of appraisal (Scherer, 2001). There is also a 
structural model (Lazarus, 1991) that focuses on the ‘what’ of appraisal – it breaks down 
emotions into relational, motivational and cognitive aspects (Lazarus, 1991). However these 
aspects are all captured in the more recent process models, which are also considered more 
dynamic because they acknowledge the cyclical processes and sub-processes of appraisal 




Contextual Appraisal Theory 
It is widely agreed that emotion involves three high-level interactive components (e.g. Scherer 
1982; Mesquita and Fridja 1992; Scherer, 2005; Niedenthal et al. 2005; Moors 2009). 
Referring to Figure 2, these are Stimulus, Appraisal and Consequence. We proceed to explain 
each high-level component according to componential appraisal theory (e.g. Arnold, 1960; 
Scherer, 2005; Lazarus, 1991; Parkinson et al, 2005; Moors, 2009).  
 
Figure 2: Contextual Appraisal Theory (CAT) 
 
Firstly, a Stimulus can be artifactual, social, physiological, or even a mixture of all three 
(Descartes, 1649; Hume, 1739; Scherer et al 1986; Callahan and McCollum 2002; Moors 
2009). There are a vast number of such stimuli that are reported in the ISD literature. For the 
purposes of pure example, these could refer to technological objects (Orlikowski, 1993; 
















(Nelson, 2007), cost overruns (Kiel, 1995), and milestones (Wixom and Watson, 2001), or 
even heart attacks that impact the ISD process (Stacey and Nandhakumar, 2006).  
 
Secondly, are the Appraisals that people make in respect of the Stimuli. The Appraisal 
component theorizes that emotions do not depend on the specific characteristics of Stimuli, 
but rather on the way people interpret and evaluate what is happening to them (Arnold, 1960; 
Scherer, 2005; Lazarus, 1991; Parkinson et al, 2005:p.6; Moors, 2009). Appraising, 
interpreting is fairly self-explanatory, but we would like to point out that there is a long 
tradition of interpretive research in ISD that focuses on the interpretations of ISD participants. 
For example, Walsham (1993) examined the meanings that  organizational actors attached to 
the design, development and implementation of one stimuli – an information system (IS) at a 
processing company. The author describes a poignant interpretation of the IS project by a 
Works Manager, revealing the lack of shared understanding between commercial and 
production subcultures about the significance of an IS project: “I don’t think our managing 
director fully understood the concept and what is involved – as a result none of us (the senior 
management team) really threw our weight behind it.” (Walsham, 1993:p84). The Appraisal 
component is theorized to comprise a number of appraisal variables (Moors, 2009:p.630) or 
sub-components: novelty, norm, intrinsic pleasantness, goal and coping potential (Scherer, 
1987; Moors, 2009:p.630). In Figure 2 these are displayed as bubbles circling around 
“Appraisals”. These can be used to unpack interpretations such as the Walsham example in 
order to help understand and address the emotional dynamics at play in an episode. We 
discuss these in detail later in the manuscript. Associated with these sub-components are 
interpretative schemes and aspects of human agency, discussion of which we defer for now. 
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Suffice it to say that these two theories allow us to unpack and understand the sub-
components further, which we believe is a particularly novel feature of our work.  
 
The Third high-level component pertains to the various intended and unintended 
Consequences of the Appraisal in terms of any emotion produced and action taken (e.g. 
Lazarus, 1968, 1991; Scherer 1987, 2005; Moors 2009; Callahan and McCollum 2002; 
Parkinson, et al 2005). An unintended consequence of an interpretive emotion could be action 
that reproduces and/or transforms the social structures present in an ISD project (Giddens, 
1984; Walsham, 1993; Faulkner and Runde, 2013), such as reinforcing a certain managerial 
approach, for example. The consequences of the appraisal feeds back into the emotion cycle 
producing stimuli that triggers the ‘emotional chain reaction’ again. Indeed this process is 
recognized as recursive and ongoing (Scherer, 1987).  
 
Having presented the three high-level components of the contextual appraisal theory, we 
proceed with a detailed theoretical analysis of them. This unpacking is what would be 
expected of any Type II theory (Gregor, 2006). For instance, structuration theory (Jones and 
Karsten, 1999) – a widely used theoretical lens in ISD – has the three main dimensions 
Signification, Domination, and Legitimation (Giddens, 1984), which in turn have a number of 
derivative concepts, such as stocks of knowledge (Walsham, 1993), temporal-spatial ordering 
of social practices (Sahay, 1997) and constraint (Nandhakumar and Jones 1997).  
 
The Stimulus Component 
What is a stimulus? Why ‘stimulus’? The emotion literature uses this word very deliberately 
and consistently. It is defined in the OED as a physiological term, meaning something that 
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acts as a ‘goad’ or ‘spur’ to a languid bodily organ; an agency that stimulates organic activity, 
where organic means ‘of the body’.  
 
Firstly, this is ontologically very telling and insightful per se. Since early modern philosophy 
emotion scholarship has adopted a functionalist ontology, the hallmarks of which appear in 
terms such as ‘stimulus’. From Descartes (1649) to Scherer (1987) emotion theorists have 
looked to human biology as the science that can provide the most compatible model. For 
instance, in Descartes’ (1649) study of emotion, he presents a neuro-biological account: 
 
“Finally, it is known that all these movements of the muscles, as well as all the senses, 
depends on nerves, which are like little filaments or little tubes which all come from the brain 
and which contain just as it does, a certain very fine air or wind, called the animal spirits.” 
(p.22) 
 
Indeed, “filaments” and “animal spirits” dominate his ideas on emotion. This neuro-
anatomical focus was influenced by Hippocratic medical theory, which posited that human 
emotions were governed by four bodily fluids or ‘humours’ - melancholy (from Greek for 
black bile), phlegmatic (after phlegm), sanguine for blood and choleric (anger, from the Greek 
for yellow bile). From this biological, functionalist stance, an emotional stimulus is both 
material and objective, being of the body and the outside world (Descartes, 1649). This is 





“…impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, 
from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to 
the external organs.” (p.275-276) 
 
Secondly, early functionalism assumes that emotion enters us, is sprung upon us by ‘animal 
spirits’ and other external non-human emanations. It is as though we were being ‘infected’ by 
emotional stimuli. Because these came from elsewhere, the human being was not to be held 
accountable for them; emotions were imposed, determined. This is consistent with Lockian 
thought, which explained emotions and their emanations in Creationist terms, reinforcing a 
distanciation between emotional stimuli and the human being. The character of the stimuli 
were associated, even connoted with particular pleasure-pain emotions: 
 
“It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, and the ideas which we 
receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in 
several objects, to several degrees, that those faculties which he had endowed us with might 
not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.” (Locke, 1695:p.98) 
 
Thirdly, the implication is that the human body is by default emotion-less, hence ‘languid’, 
requiring emotional stimulation. Without organic bodily activity no emotion is deemed to 
have occurred. But not all human bodily activity is emotional – there are a great many that 
occur, even without our knowledge, and produce no discernible emotion. What qualifies as an 





Qualifying Emotional Stimuli 
While acknowledging that Cartesian material stimuli were primary, Hume (1739) suggested 
there were secondary reflective impressions also. He hypothesized that these were responsible 
for the actual manifestation of specific emotions:  
 
“Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, 
either immediately or by the interposition of its idea… Of the first kind are all the impressions 
of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other 
emotions resembling them.”  (Book II, part I, sect. I).   
 
Hume (1739) presents us with a refined understanding then of what may qualify as an 
emotional stimuli. It is one that results in a secondary reflective impression; until this happens 
it is only pleasure or pain. Hume (1739) is perhaps the seed of the Cognitive Turn in emotion 
in the early 20th Century, which moved away from the functionalistic Feeling-centred view 
towards prioritizations of the mental, reflective, subjective, and phenomenological character 
of emotion. In traditional cognitivism (e.g. Broad, 1925; Stout, 1929; Price, 1953) emotion is 
mentally directed at an outer-objective stimulus. The objective stimulus is subjected to the 
intellectual functions of understanding and judgment, instead of vague reflections or 
impressions (Deigh, 1994 on Hume, 1739): 
 
“Emotions then are classified within this theory as cognitions, since the theory conceives of 




According to Deigh (1994), the kinds of emotions of cognizance include anger, fear, envy, 
shame, pity, and so forth (p.831) but exclude the ‘primitive’ emotions or impressions of 
sensation (Hume, 1739). Although sunbathing involves the pleasure of a natural object – the 
sun – there is little or no cognitive, intellectual operation applied to it. By contrast, anger 
involves a person intellectualizing a feeling about someone, because they feel ‘violated’ by 
them in some way.  
 
From a traditional cognitivist stance then, an emotional stimuli is more than one that results in 
just reflections or impressions of phenomena. Rather it is one that stimulates a cognizance in 
the subject of the objective stimulus and the intellectual cognitions that are performed on the 
object. An emotional stimulus can only be such if it can elicit the intellectual attention of the 
subject. To understand this awareness process further we may draw on the concept of 
reflexive monitoring (Giddens, 1984). Reflexive monitoring involves subjects in the 
monitoring of their actions in relation to their social contexts (Giddens 1984). It is a means of 
sensitizing and adapting themselves to situations by taking notice of or selectively ignoring 
phenomena in accordance with their goals (Lazarus, 1991). It is a key concept in structuration 
theory that accounts for how and why actors reproduce routine aspects of life as well as 
transforming them through knowledgeable agentic interventions; it is the main anchoring 
feature of social integration (Giddens, 1984: p.191).  
 
From this we can further refine our qualification of an emotional stimulus - not only should it 
result in a cognizance and an intellectual operation on it, but it has implications for the subject 
in terms of their reflexive monitoring (an aspect of cognizance). Not only must it provoke a 
cognition then, but it is only cognitively processed because it relates to a goal (Lazarus, 1991) 
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of the subject, which is an essential ‘check’ in the reflexive monitoring of social processes. 
For example, an emotional stimulus in an ISD project can only be such if there is an 
implication for a goal, whether of a personal or collective nature, such as a deadline. A missed 
deadline is an emotional event (Soderlund, 2005). For an emotional stimulus to be ‘noticed’ 
and cognitively processed, ‘something must happen’ to the goals set in the normative course 
of ISD work. A pre-condition of an emotional stimulus then is that goals have been set either 
personally or collectively and that a course of action in respect of those goals is already 
underway. By establishing goals and processes the seeds are then set for emotional stimuli. 
These could relate to all manner of ISD phenomena including milestones, lines of code, 
development cycles and so forth.  
 
In contemporary cognitivism (e.g. Schacter et al, 1962) it is possible to abstract emotion from 
any material, objective stimulus; it can be ‘complete thought’ (Deigh, 1994). The subject 
generates and experiences an emotion through pure thought or meditation without reference to 
any intro/extrospective object. This contemporary cognitive view suggests an agentic aspect 
to emotion - the individual can enter a generative as opposed to a responsive mode of 
emoting. This is perhaps the area that normative ISD project work is least amenable to, in 
terms of establishing emotional stimuli through goals and so forth. This subjectivist 
interpretation means that individuals’ generative emotion can itself be a stimulus in a 
situation; an affective form of agency that can shape ISD work. This disagrees with the 
Feeling-centered view of emotion, which implies that the human body is by default emotion-




Summarizing this discussion of the Stimulus component, emotional stimuli can be  objective, 
inter-subjective and subjective in nature. Early modern philosophy regarded these as 
objective, whereas traditional and contemporary cognitivism accept them as inter-subjective 
and subjective, respectively. With some closure, we can say that in order for a stimulus to 
qualify as emotional, a phenomenon must stimulate a cognizance and an intellectual operation 
on it, and have implications for the subject’s reflexive monitoring. The phenomenon is only 
cognitively processed and so recognized as an emotional stimulus because it relates to a goal 
of the subject. This is an apt juncture at which to shift our discussion to the ‘next’ component 
– Appraisal – which expands our understanding of the cognitive processing that takes place 
with respect to a stimulus.  
 
The Appraisal Component 
An appraisal is defined by the OED as the action or an act of estimating or assessing the 
quality or worth of something or someone. We can see the qualities of assessment and worth 
in the above discussion of what qualifies as an emotional stimuli – e.g. does something matter 
in relation to personal or collective goals and ‘projects’ (Lazarus, 1991; Giddens, 1993). This 
is one aspect of the process by which people interpret and evaluate what is happening to them 
as per Appraisal theory (Arnold, 1960; Scherer, 2005; Lazarus, 1991; Parkinson et al, 
2005:p.6; Moors, 2009). According to the theory, appraisal involves five sub-components or 
appraisal variables (Scherer, 2005; Moors, 2009). These sub-components are: novelty, 
intrinsic pleasantness, goal/need significance, coping potential and norm/self compatibility. 
While emotion theorists largely agree on these five, they disagree on whether they occur in 
strict a order (Moors 2009; Scherer, 1987). We take a teleological perspective on this point – 
i.e. that purpose or goal (the production of an emotion) is the final cause for guiding 
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movement of an emotional entity (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995:p.515-516). In this sense the 
order of movement through the sub-components is not fixed or prescribed; it does not matter. 
What does matter is that there is a purpose or goal. In our discussion of Stimulus, we 
established the premiss that in order for an emotional stimulus to be recognized as such, a 
goal must have been identified. Therefore a teleological assumption is justifiable on this 
point, hence the non-sequential presentation of the sub-components in the CAT model (Figure 
2). We proceed to discuss each sub-component in no particular order, even though we 
numerically itemize them below. 
 
• The ‘first’ sub-component involves an evaluation of the novelty of the stimulus. Various 
questions are considered: Is it a familiar event? Does it occur frequently? (Zajonc, 1980). Is it 
predictable or not? (e.g. Miller, 1981; Mineka & Henderson, 1985). Can the stimulus be 
ignored? If the answer to these questions is ‘no’ then a process of orienting, focusing and 
alerting occurs (Averill, 1975; Plutchik, 1980), or, if yes, then homeostasis and some level of 
certainty about the nature of the stimuli occurs (Scherer, 1987). This orienting, focusing and 
alerting tends to be associated with ‘pain’, whereas the homeostasis is something more 
comfortable or pleasurable. However, while these questions are helpful in understanding the 
sub-component,  they are somewhat misleading as the reality may not involve so precise an 
evaluation. The assessment of novelty depends on the individual’s reflexive monitoring, 
which contributes to their awareness of their own and their peers’ experience and knowledge.  
 
• Secondly, this novelty assessment manifests itself in a cognitivistic sense of intrinsic 
pleasantness, i.e. the mental pleasure and/or pain associated with a stimulus. Various 
possibilities occur here - novelty may induce a pleasant surprise, while a familiar unwelcome 
19 
 
stimulus could induce frustration if, for instance, learning has not occurred since the last 
encounter that could resolve the challenge posed. Indeed, a variety of feelings are possible – 
the ones we mention are merely indicative and this sub-component remains highly subjective 
(e.g., Block, 1995; Nagel, 1974).   
 
• A ‘third’ sub-component is goal/need significance – i.e. what is the significance and relevance 
of the stimulus to the actor’s goals? Does the event really matter in light of them? Transaction 
appraisal theorists argue that those stimuli appraised as relevant to a central goal are 
particularly emotional (Lazarus, 1991; Moors, 2007; Scherer, 2005). As per our discussion on 
qualifying emotional stimuli, reflexive monitoring also plays a key role here. It is an activity 
that is already at work when a stimulus comes into view. Given that it overlaps the Stimulus 
qualification and the more deliberate appraisal process, one may perhaps prioritize this 
activity, hence we interpose reflexive monitoring between Stimulus and Appraisal in Figure 2.  
 
• A ‘fourth’ sub-component is coping potential, i.e. what capability does the actor possess to be 
able to cope with the Stimulus and its consequences? This involves belief (lowercase b), 
knowledge and agency (Scherer, 1987), i.e. what the subject believes about a stimulus and 
what capability they have to be able to control it. For example, an encounter with a snake or a 
new ISD tool in the outside world can invoke an intuitive fear response. However, agentic 
(re)evaluation may then over-ride initial intuitive belief (e.g. Greenspan, 1988; Moors, 2009). 
By employing knowledge acquired through education the agent realizes that the type of snake 
encountered is only a grass snake, and not dangerous. The nature of the object and its 
significance to the agent will therefore determine what knowledge is appropriate and can 
support the evaluative aspect of emotion (Solomon, 1976:pp.185-87; Nussbaum, 1990:p. 
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292). This challenges in some ways the appraisal theory that emotion does not rely on the 
character of the stimulus; knowledge is an aspect of the subject’s coping potential, helping 
regulate the emotion, which does depend on the type of stimulus. For instance, resentment is a 
moral-based emotion – it relies on exposure to moral education and socialization (Deigh, 
1994:p.839), to knowledge of norms of ethical conduct. Therefore, the subject’s exposure to 
social/institutional structures plays a role too in their capability to cope. As Argyris (1971) 
predicted:  
 
“As their interpersonal competence in these [emotional] areas increases they will naturally 
turn to education and structural changes…Under these conditions the participants would also 
tend to develop a responsibility of continually monitoring their solutions to correct the 
failures. In short, the team members may need to be helped to modify their behavior” (B-290) 
 
• And finally, the norm/self-compatibility sub-component involves a consultation with the 
situated norms of responses to stimuli (e.g. Scherer, 1986). For example, “is my discursive 
and gesticular reaction compatible with others?” “Am I over-reacting?” The gesticular side 
involves a monitoring of the display rules of emotion (Ekman, 1973).  
 
The cultural psychology literature (Mesquita and Fridja, 1982; Good and Kleinman, 1984; 
Kleinman and Good, 1985; Lutz and White, 1986; Shweder and Haidt, 2000) focuses on and 
develops the character and role of such socially constructed rules or schemes of meaning 
(Scherer, 1987). What has not occurred to date is an integration of such an approach into 
componential appraisal theory. Appraisal/interpretation does not happen in a vacuum 
(Parkinson, 2001:p.173; Manstead and Fischer, 2001:p.221); interpretivist researchers attest 
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to its context (e.g. Malinowski, 1954; Geertz, 1973; Kling and Scacchi, 1982; Curtis et al., 
1988; Walsham, 1993; Nandhakumar and Avison, 1999; Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001). To 
conceptualize the interpretive/appraisal context we draw on the theory of  ‘interpretative 
schemes’ (Ranson et al 1980; Bartunek 1984; Giddens 1984; Shweder and Haidt, 2000).  
 
Interpretative Schemes  
During interpretative occasions people draw on ‘interpretative schemes’ to help them make 
sense of that occasion (Giddens, 1984; 1993; Bartunek, 1984). For example, when a hand is 
extended in a greeting it is mutually understood that a handshake should normally follow. If 
one is asked to play tennis during office hours it will be mutually understandable if the offer 
is declined because work comes first (Giddens, 1993:p.105). If as two acquainted people walk 
towards each other and their eyes do not meet, then they do not need to say “hello”. Or, when 
a client and a design practice enter into a contract, it is mutually understood, for now, that 
payment will made using a currency other than ‘Bitcoins’. These examples of the mutual 
comprehension of meaning involves unspoken interpretative assumptions in routine settings – 
i.e. that we should shake hands as a formal greeting, and that work takes precedence over play 
within normal office hours. These instances involve people drawing upon mutual knowledge 
that is taken-for-granted (Giddens, 1993:p.105), operating in the background as an 
‘interpretative resource’ to be drawn upon to make sense of socioemotional encounters. 
However, it may be necessary that the scheme is openly expressed in order to substantiate or 
assert particular interpretations, such as rules. This may involve reference to physical, 
material and social aspects of context, i.e. emotional stimuli, such as an ISD contract or tool. 
The appropriation of physical resources in social discourse is a fundamental aspect of 
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agreement, and cannot be severed from a backdrop of largely implicit, mutual knowledge - 
the former is interpreted in light of the latter (Giddens, 1993:p.105).  
 
This appropriation requires agency, i.e. an individual’s power, knowledgeability and 
capability to take (meaningful) action, such as the maintenance or even disruption of human 
relations through reflexive monitoring (Giddens, 1993:p.97). In summary (see Figure 3), 
interpretative schemes comprise mutual knowledge that is largely unspoken, taken-for-
granted, assumptive (Gouldner, 1971) and involves the agentic appropriation of physical 
aspects of context. A note on how this ‘knowledge’ is acquired – it is not ‘endowed’ but 
‘learned’ through exposure to and participation in a wide variety of normative processes and 
situations such as education, training, and upbringing. 
 
 
Figure 3: interpretative schemes in social interaction 
 
Implications for Appraisal Sub-components 
Some implications follow from the above discussion. We can say that if an interpretative 
scheme is identified that is relevant to the appraisal of the stimulus then it is likely that this 
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cannot be identified as relevant to the appraisal of the stimulus then there exists a lack of 
emotional guidance and a ‘first principles’ search will ensue (Averill, 1975; Plutchik, 1980) in 
an effort to overcome the ‘knowledge’ gap. In order to identify an appropriate interpretative 
scheme the character of the stimulus in its context needs to be considered. Clearly some 
interpretative schemes will not be appropriate – e.g. a taken-for-granted knowledge of snakes 
is not going to be useful in emotionally comprehending a major unexpected ‘bug’ in a 
software module. Having said that, the appropriation of meaning requires agency, and analog 
interpretative schemes may be ‘consulted’ that offer unique insights into the situation. Some 
interpretive creativity is therefore a possibility in the invocation of interpretive schemes while 
‘processing’ an emotional experience.  
 
Specific Implications for Appraisal Sub-components: 
• Novelty: if an interpretative scheme cannot be identified as relevant to the appraisal of the 
stimulus, then the stimulus will be appraised as novel and unfamiliar, leading to a process of 
alerting and searching (Averill, 1975; Plutchik, 1980). Conversely, an identifiable 
interpretative scheme gives an initial orientation and focus to the emotional experience.  
 
• Goal/need significance: We have established that through reflexive monitoring people 
evaluate whether the stimulus really matters, i.e. in reference to their own goals. However, 
interpretative schemes may nuance the situation by bringing goals of a higher order into 
focus. For instance, say a developer initially makes light of a design flaw because they do not 
conceive it to be a priority. The team manager in the shared social context may think 
otherwise however on account of their understanding of the wider implications. The developer 
may anticipate this having worked consistently with the manager for some time and therefore 
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produce a more emotional response than initially anticipated – a ‘whoops’ moment if you 
will, informed and ‘rescued’ through heedful inter-relating (Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
Interpretative schemes can help re-orient the appraisal then, in accordance with normative, 
situational rules.  
 
• Coping potential: From the points made regarding novelty and goal, the agentic means by 
which interpretative schemes are drawn upon informs how stimuli are (re)evaluated, thereby 
over-riding or modifying initial beliefs (e.g. Greenspan, 1988; Moors, 2009). This interpretive 
agency is enabled by exposure to learning situations, along with the capability to internalize 
and recall the ‘message’ of each. We may consider the engagement with and manipulation of 
interpretative schemes as part of a subject’s coping potential or affective agency. Consider a 
day-to-day example – although an encounter with the dentist’s chair usually evokes anxiety, 
the patient employs the implicit knowledge that the health-check activity should be 
undertaken on the grounds of health; it rationalizes the encounter. This ‘struggles’ with other 
interpretative schemes that the patient may draw on based on accounts told and re-told 
regarding displeasurable dentist visits; it is taken-for-granted that these are relatively 
intimidating experiences. Therefore there is not necessarily one all-conclusive interpretative 
scheme per appraisal; an assemblage of them may be appropriate. It is up to the individuals to 
trade-them-off, rationalize, combine, and generally employ them in their social encounters in 
accordance with their agentic capability (Giddens, 1993).  
 
• Norm/self-compatibility: it follows that by engaging with and understanding a variety of 
interpretative schemes that apply to a variety of situations, apposite display rules of emotion 
will be (re)produced (Ekman, 1973), but in accordance with the reflexive monitoring of the 
25 
 
situation. Put another way, displays of emotion while informed by interpretative schemes and 
the situational norms, they will be commensurate with the personal intentions realized during 
reflexive monitoring.  
 
The above are refinements we have made to current understandings of four sub-components 
in componential appraisal theory. We proceed now to discuss the third high-level component - 
Consequence. 
 
The Consequences Component 
Out of the appraisal process emerge appraisal consequences. A decision is taken over how to 
emote and act (Lazarus, 1968, 1991; Scherer, 1987, 2001, 2005; Moors, 2009; Clore & 
Centerbar, 2004; Callahan and McCollum, 2002; Parkinson et al, 2005) – does one smile 
when criticized by a manager, for example? This could be a strategy to keep oneself 
motivated in immediately rectifying the problem, aided by drawing on team-level 
interpretative schemes that inform us that the manager is notoriously pedantic. Interpretative 
schemes afford us some perspective in this idiographic example, which inform both the 
appraisal and the consequence. This socio-cognitive response is distinguished from 
physiological reflexes such as knee-jerks, which have no cognitive content (Leventhal & 
Scherer, 1987). Appraisal consequences may be an effort to bring work back into rhythm – an 
emotion-led homeostasis. The consequences then produce new stimuli, which depending on 
their qualities, may introduce new emotional ‘chain reactions’. While some people ‘edit’ their 
emotion responses in order to minimize the possibility of generating new disruptive stimuli 
according to their understanding of ethical conduct (Giddens, 1984), others may exert their 
agency and not care about the repercussions, preferring to live on the edge with the 
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consequences (Highsmith, 2002). Consequences in terms of emotions produced may reflect 
and reproduce or even change existing organizational arrangements such as snubbing a 
management structure (Walsham, 1993:p84). Consequences are multi-level – emotions are 
not only mental but are socially displayed too (Ekman, 1973), which are actions themselves.  
 
Having discussed the CAT model in some detail, we now reiterate our intended contributions, 
before proceeding to discuss and affirm its philosophical validity. 
 
Contributions and Implications 
Our first contribution is that we have developed and discussed our contextual model of 
appraisal theory (CAT) – in our view the ISD field needs such a comprehensive theorization 
of emotion in order to further the study and understanding of it. It is a Type II theory, which is 
appropriate since emotion is still imperfectly understood in the field (Gregor, 2006:p.625). It 
is also meant to be teleological in nature (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995:p.515-516) – the 
emotional outcomes matter more than the sequence in which the (sub)components occur 
(Moors, 2009).  
 
Secondly, CAT provides a means for structuring the collection and analysis of data in 
emotion studies. Similar approaches have been observed in emotion studies such as Smith and 







Some implications of the CAT model follow:  
 
The first possible implication is that IS developers’ agency plays a large role in responding to, 
regulating and generating emotion. This agency, or affective agency, involves: 
 
(1) Clarifying multi-level goals so developers know what to care about. 
 
(2) Reflexive monitoring in consonance with ISD goals. 
 
(3) Reflexive monitoring should be managed to involve exposure to/engagement with a 
variety of interpretative schemes that relate to a goal, thereby developing a portfolio of 
schemes to orient the ISD professional. 
 
(4) Points 2 and 3 lead to learning  
 
(5) As per Argyris (1971), learning enhances the professional’s potential to cope with 
emotionality 
 
(6) The capability to select, adapt and synthesize interpretative schemes depending on the 
novelty of a stimulus. 
 
(7) The capability to actively evaluate stimuli in terms of the sub-components: goals, 




These abstracted implications can be anchored into contemporary issues in ISD such as cost-
time overruns (e.g. Kiel, 1999), control and release (e.g. Humphrey et al. 1991), agile versus 
waterfall (e.g. Beck and Boehm, 2003), system analyst-user communication (e.g. Newman 
and Noble, 1990), and so forth.  Emotion is an important pin across these issue because it is 
the mediator across the interpretation of key stimuli/events, and the prudent action and 
reactions to them. Consilient or differential emotional reactions signal consilient or 
differential interpretations and the ‘chain reactions’ that follow. Differential emotional 
responses could be the result of misaligned goals, lack of awareness i.e. to much silo-ing, 
interpretative schemes that are in flux and therefore provide no binding force in a team. Of 
course, emotions are displayed differently according to culture and backgrounds (Ekman, 
1973) but there are ‘pressure points’ that managers/professionals can monitor and therefore 
anticipate and detect emotional responses. Managers should consider the novelty of ISD 
stimuli, the ability of individuals under their responsibility to cope, the norms of the group 
and multi-level goals - of individuals, sub-groups and groups, the degree of engagement 
(reflexive monitoring) of professionals, which is observable to some degree via actions and 
language use (interpretative schemes). This is only possible if managers really engage with 
their staff in the first place.  
 
Firstly, an issue in cost-time overruns is the inability of groups to correctly anticipate and 
monitor whether and how system projects are progressing. The interpretive frames, supported 
by particular tools and techniques (e.g. SW-CMM, sprints, milestones) often supersedes the 
setting and regulating of action towards goals. Emotion is a valuable informating and 
adaptation mechanism in this respect (Fineman, 2003; Scherer, 1987). By unravelling, tapping 
into and understanding team members’ emotions, managers can uncover serious issues in a 
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project, and thereby setup adaptive strategies to deal with the situation. According to CAT, 
emotional responses to stimuli can be unpacked and understood in terms of multi-level goals, 
novelty of the stimuli, coping potential of the team, reflexive monitoring of participants or 
their ‘engagement’ to put it more crudely, the interpretative schemes that are invoked through 
the responses, as well as the alignment between these contextual appraisal variables (Figure 
2). The ‘true’ impact or consequences of stimuli can be better understood in this way. Indeed, 
this analysis of the emotional responses to stimuli may unravel much more than first 
anticipated, providing useful information to managers. For instance, through this process, 
related issues such as individuals’ knowledge deficiencies may be revealed. Looking at this 
the other way round, managers could proactively strive for cost/time control by considering 
potential traps relating to goals, novelty, coping potential, reflexive monitoring and 
interpretative schemes.  
 
Secondly, in control and release situations two different emotional frames are brought into 
play – one evaluative and the other generative.  The emotional dynamics involved here are 
two different emotional realities and both can be recognized and invoked at different points-
in-time. The generative emotional frame works the other way round, having implications for 
the contextual appraisal variables as project variables – i.e. the novelty, goal, capabilities, 
norms, and even language or informational aspects of the project artifacts. The generation of 
these aspects then folds back into a control mode, which become stimuli in themselves and 
project participants then have to deal with and manage the consequences of their ideas.  
 
Thirdly, with regards agile versus waterfall, these have different stimulus-appraisal-emotion 
settings. The former responds to project outcomes without setting broad project goals; 
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responding to stimuli through a generative approach. The latter manages the unexpected by 
planning for the expected and then monitoring reactions to stimuli through control. 
 
Fourthly, there are implications for systems analyst - user communication. Different 
emotional dynamics occur depending on the role of the analyst, either as facilitator or expert 
(Hirschheim and Klein, 1989). As a facilitator the analyst plays a more negotiative, neutral 
role; this role could be enhanced by the analyst paying attention to CAT appraisal variables – 
they can be used in facilitating a solution and brokering agreement. As an expert there is 
much more potential for emotional disruption, whether negative or positive, depending on 
how this is carried out. Again, cogniscence of the CAT appraisal variables could enable the 
expert to conduct the work more sensitively and therefore successfully.  
 
Secondly, there are implications for structuration theory. Giddens has been criticized for his 
lack of attention to the inner-life of the agent (Bailyn, 2002; Callahan, 2004). Archer (2000) 
goes further to point out that this is a symptomatic of sociology in general. Our CAT model 
shows that derivative concepts of structuration such as reflexive monitoring and interpretative 
schemes can be integrated with processual appraisal theory – thereby creating a bridge 
between the socio/agentic and emotional realms. Further, our model implies that social 
structures can shape emotion. It follows then that ISD organizations need to be attentive to the 
emotional ‘chain reactions’ that structural properties can invoke. Using our model to ‘design’ 
positive (Fineman, 2003) ‘emotional chain reactions’ could potentially enhance the creative 
capacities of organizations (e.g. Amabile et al, 2005; Conradi and Fuggetta 2002; Gallivan, 




Having discussed some principal contributions and implications, we now turn to the 
philosophical validity of the CAT model.  
 
Philosophical Validity of CAT 
From the above discussion, our CAT model exhibits a mixture of functionalist and 
interpretative paradigms (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).   
 
Figure 4: Reproduced from Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
 
Functionalism is well established in emotion theory (Descartes, 1649; Locke, 1695; Hume, 
1739; Scherer, 1987) and ISD (e.g. Checkland, 1981), whereas the socio-cultural, interpretive 
aspects have only come into focus in emotion research more recently (Mesquita and Fridja, 
1982; Good and Kleinman, 1984; Kleinman and Good, 1985; Lutz and White, 1986; Shweder 
and Haidt, 2000). Drawing on Figure 2, functionalism has been employed in understanding 
the following specific features of emotion:  
 
• Emotional stimuli (Descartes, 1649; Locke, 1695; Hume, 1739; James, 1884; Scherer, 
1987, 2005) 
• Feeling-centered responses to stimuli (intrinsic pleasantness) (Descartes, 1649; Locke, 
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• Componential appraisal processes and sub-components (Scherer, 1987, 2005; 
Niedenthal et al. 2005; Moors 2009). 
 
While interpretative sociology has been employed in understanding: 
 
• Interpretative schemes – the socio-cultural, ethnic contexts of emotion - (Mesquita and 
Fridja, 1982; Good and Kleinman, 1984; Kleinman and Good, 1985; Lutz and White, 1986; 
Shweder and Haidt, 2000) 
• Human agency (Giddens, 1993) 
 
We proceed to clarify in what way we can regard these concepts as paradigmatically 
compatible, thereby addressing the philosophical validity of the model.  
 
Firstly, we would like to point out that extending a functionalistic process appraisal model 
(e.g. Scherer, 1987) with derivative concepts of structuration theory is not an paradigmatic 
violation. Consider how Giddens (1993) relates functionalistic systems to structuration 
theory:  
 
“Social systems involve relations of interdependence between individuals or groups, that 
typically can be best analyzed as recurrent social practices. Social systems are systems of 
social interaction; as they involve the situated activities of human subjects and exist 
syntagmatically in the flow of time…To study the structuration of a social system is to study 
the ways in which that system, via the application of generative rules and resources and in the 




Firstly, and in furtherance, this implies that the functionalistic, systems side of emotion is 
pertinent during recurrent social practices or routine aspects of day-to-day life. Componential 
appraisal models assume an ongoing, patterned interaction between the components in order 
to produce an emotional whole. This renders emotion as seemingly stable and predictable 
under routine conditions, and structuration indeed takes account of this in its theorizing of the 
reproduction of social structures and systems. The kinds of emotions that are salient here are 
those that consistently emerge in a context, that exhibit a routine nature: upon recurrent 
encounters with a stimulus, repeat appraisals and consequences; certain emotions may 
become systemic. Consider some indicative though not representative examples from the ISD 
literature concerning the sustained or routine aspects of ISD work:  
 
Firstly, the values of Scandinavian ISD techniques are based on community values (Floyd et 
al., 1989:p263). An emotion linked to this idea is interpersonal emotional connectedness 
(warmth and closeness) (Scholz et al, 2005:p.136) It could be argued then that Scandinavian 
ISD approaches involve ‘routine’ emotions of connectedness.  
 
Secondly, the situated appropriation of routine development cycles in Soft Systems 
Methodology (Checkland, 1981:p.276), the iterative aspects of agile methods (Kruchten 1996; 
Beck, 1999) or the Waterfall model (Royce, 1970). Routine emotions that express comfort 
(Fineman, 2003) or ontological security (Giddens, 1993) are possible, as well as constant 




“The root of the [emotional] problem often lies with long-standing and deeply embedded 
ground rules or habits that govern the group. We call those rules norms” (Goleman et al., 
2002:p223). 
 
Thirdly, consider the sustained conflict that is possible between the variety of disciplines that 
comprise ISD teams (Barki and Hartwick, 2001; Levina, 2005; Brown et al, 2008). These are 
examples of how emotional ‘chain reactions’ could become routine, exhibiting systemic 
properties, but subject to the agency of those involved:  
 
“the seed of change is there in every act which contributes towards the reproduction of any 
‘ordered’ form of social life” (Giddens, 1993:p108). 
 
This agency also signals that the hand of functionalism is inconsistent with the kinds of 
emotion that flare-up extemporaneously, whether generative or provoked, or positive or 
negative. For instance, play exhibits a fleeting nature which is an escape from routine 
(Huizinga, 1970:p.26). Play radiates spontaneity (Zain and Rickards, 1996), and being on the 
verge of being beyond control (Sroufe and Waters, 1976). Play evokes emotion, “a free and 
voluntary activity, a source of joy and amusement” (Huizinga, 1970:p26), and joy is “a sense 
of pleasure plus the urge toward exuberance and contact-seeking” (Frijda, 1988:p351). These 
kinds of nonroutine, extemporaneous emotions have an unpredictable nature that are more 
agentic, (inter)subjective, and non-systemic; they evolve outside of any social patterning 
(Giddens, 1993). Improvisation has similarities to that of play in its being situated and 
emergent (Ciborra, 2002) occurring at the meeting point of thought and action, at a moment in 
time (Orlikowski, 1996; Ciborra, 1999; Stacey and Nandhakumar, 2009). At the same time, it 
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has an ordered, interpretivist shade in the sense that improvising actors are able to bring order 
from the clutches of disorder; “chaordic” action (Highsmith, 2002). Take the following 
example regarding developing a Graphical User Interface (GUI) which although not intended 
by the following authors to be demonstrative of improvisation, there is a sense of it, “if you 
are developing a graphic user interface (GUI) for an unprecedented decision support system 
and want to document its requirements, the most frequent answer you will get from users is, 
“I can’t tell you in advance, but I’ll know it when I see it (IKIWISI). In such a case, it is a 
high risk to try to document the GUI in advance” (Ågerfalk and Fitzgerald, 2006:p31). In this 
quote is the element of sense emerging from uncertainty.  
 
In such complex situations actors may start with alternative and often competing explanations 
for experiences and events, but insist that “Over time, interpretations become objectified, 
diffused, and widely internalized into what comes to be called a consensus on what is ‘out 
there’” Weick, 1995:p79). This is particularly noticeable during emergencies where capable 
individuals and teams improvise life-saving solutions out of chaos (Ciborra 1999). For 
example, although not life-saving, it was reported how system designers had to ‘design in the 
dark’ by trying to second-guess the requirements due to unforeseen lack of access to 
executive users (Nandhakumar and Jones, 1997). Improvisation depends on and helps 
transform the situation.  
 
In this way, an improvised process begins with the possibility of nonroutine emoting while 
tending towards the ordered, more systemic kind as ‘things settled down’ and sense emerges; 




Structuration theory is capable of capturing this mélange of the agentic and the systemic and 
their inter-relationship. Therefore, we qualify that a structurationist perspective enables the 
paradigmatic and epistemological compatibility of the concepts presented in the CAT model 
(Figure 2). We may ‘know’ emotion both systemically and interpretatively.  
 
Further, while both functionalism and interpretivism assume the pursuit of ‘order’ or structure 
(Hirschheim and Klein, 1989:p.1202) (see Figure 4), they differ in terms of ontology however 
- Burrell and Morgan (1979) classify interpretivism as subjective, and functionalism as 
objective. Objectivism or materialism regards the world as consisting of matter and that all 
the things in the world are differentiated solely by different material constitutions (Benton and 
Craib, 2001: p.183). Subjectivism or idealism regards reality as purely mental or traces in the 
mind (Giddens, 1993:p.117). Dualism addresses the weaknesses of this binary opposition - 
idealists are not convincing in their negation of a material independent external reality, nor are 
materialists with respect to their denial of an inner subjective experience (Benton and Craib, 
2001). Social reality is rather viewed as consisting of body and mind. There are a variety of 
duality theories including the transformational model of social action (Bhaskar, 1978), 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; Barley, 1986; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Orlikowski 
and Robey, 1991; Walsham, 1993; Jones and Nandhakumar, 1993; Stacey and Nandhakumar, 
2009) and more recently sociomaterialism (Orlikowski, 2007; Orlikowski and Scott, 2008), 
which builds on the structurationist duality of technology approach (Leonardi, 2013:p.65). 
Sociomaterialism focuses on the bound-up nature of the social and material:  
 
“Research framed according to the tenets of a sociomaterial approach challenges the deeply 
taken-for-granted assumption that technology, work, and organizations should be 
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conceptualized separately, and advances the view that there is an inherent inseparability 
between the technical and the social.” (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008: p.434) 
 
Sociomaterialism emphasizes the mutuality of actors and objects; they are bound-up in a 
composite assemblage that expresses their inextricable relationship. Sociomaterialism 
attempts to distance itself from duality theories. There has been discussion of an ontological 
shift away from structuration theory to agential realism (Barad, 2003:p.816; Leonardi, 
2013:p.65; Orlikowski, 2007:p.1438) on account that the former emphasizes independently 
existing entities (humans and technology) as opposed to constitutive entanglement. In our 
view, such an ontological shift is unnecessary in the CAT model for two reasons. Firstly, in 
structuration theory’s discussion of interpretative schemes, which plays a key role in the 
model, the material aspects of social discourse are affirmed as being fundamental to 
agreement; materiality cannot be severed from interpretative schemes - the former is 
interpreted in light of the latter (Giddens, 1993:p.105). Secondly, the structurational 
dimensions (Signification, domination, legitimation) and realms (structure, agency) are only 
identified by Giddens (1984) for analytical convenience (Orlikowski, 1992:p.408; Walsham 
1993:p60; Reijonen, 2000); their bound-up nature was always intended.  
 
We therefore adopt a structurationist ontology in our understanding and articulation of 
emotion. While the sociomaterial debate focuses on technology objects and people, it does not 
preclude other forms of materiality such as the body (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008:p.455), 
which of course is fundamental in terms of the physiology of emotion (Descartes, 1649; 
James, 1884; Scherer, 1987). As well as the physiological materialities are the technological 
ones (e.g. Faulkner and Runde, 2013), which are conceptualized in the CAT model as 
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emotional stimuli, whose recognition and appraisal relies on the reflexive monitoring of the 
agent and interpretative schemes that they activate. Therefore it makes sense to couch the 
CAT model as a structurationist sociomaterial theory. We now proceed to further discuss and 
interpret our model in light of these ontological notes.  
 
While the CAT model identifies three high-level components, appraisal sub-components, 
involving agentic activities (reflexive monitoring) and structural properties (interpretative 
schemes), these features are identified for analytical convenience only (Walsham 1993:p60); 
their inextricable composition (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008) is assumed. The material 
(physiological, technological) and discursive stimuli, their interpretative processing and 
consequences, constitute a composite shifting assemblage; they are mutually constitutive of 
the emotion activity. The material (physiological, technological), social (interpretative 
schemes) and cognitive (reflexive monitoring, appraisal) dimensions are integral to emotion. 
The model could be a candidate conceptual lens in the study of emotional sociomateriality in 
ISD (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008:p.437).  
 
In the following section we present a vignette which we draw upon to provide the empirical 
material we need to illustrate how the CAT model (Figure 2) can be use as a Type II theory 
(Gregor, 2006).  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have justified a focus on emotion and developed a Type II theory (Gregor, 
2006) of emotion ‘CAT’ for ISD phenomena through an inductive reasoning approach (Van 
de Ven and Poole, 1995). For this contextualized appraisal theory we drew on process 
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appraisal theory (e.g. Scherer, 1987) and extended it with derivative concepts from 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). Follow-on contributions included an understanding of 
what emotion shapes and is shaped by. CAT can also be used to structure the collection and 
analysis of data regarding emotion in ISD. Some implications are that IS developers’ agency 
plays a large part in responding to, regulating and generating emotion, i.e. affective agency. 
Seven implications were given on this note, including the clarification of ISD project goals, as 
well as the alignment of reflexive monitoring and interpretative schemes with them. These 
abstracted implications were anchored into contemporary ISD issues including cost-time 
overruns (e.g. Kiel, 1995), control and release (e.g. Humphrey et al. 1991), agile versus 
waterfall (e.g. Beck and Boehm, 2003), and system analyst-user communication (e.g. 
Newman and Noble, 1990). 
 
The paradigmatic validity of the model was also discussed, concluding that a structurationist 
perspective enables the paradigmatic and epistemological compatibility of the concepts 
presented in the CAT model (Figure 2). 
 
In rejoinder to the justifications for this study and theorization of emotion at the beginning of 
the manuscript, have we come far since Argyris (1971). Perhaps we have by a deep 
engagement with mainstream emotion theories and the development of a theoretical lens to 
enable future studies. Empirical work is needed to put CAT to work. With regards the process 
obstructions that emotions can cause (J2), these can possibly be overcome through 
formulating agreements in ISD teams in terms of multi-level goals, and the sharing of 
interpretative schemes. With regards (J4), with CAT we can enhance managers’ capacity to 
deal with emotionality through fostering affective agency in terms of reflexive monitoring, 
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goal setting, as well as engagement with various interpretative schemes/resources.  With 
regards (J6) emotions are a motivational resource when they connect with agentic and 
structural properties such as shared multi-level goals and interpretative schemes.  
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